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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF r:eHE ESTATE
of
No. 8809
HILLARD L. VOORHEES,
Deceased.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This is an interlocutory appeal granted by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah on April 2, 1958, from
the Order of the District Court of Sanpete County of
December 23, 1957, as modified on December 24, 1957,
appointing Tracy-Collins '"Prust Company ~ue<·e~sor administrator of the Estate of Hillard L. Voorhees, Deceased.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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For the sake of clarity in this Brief the parties shall
be referred to as they appear before this Court. Mrs.
Pearl 0. Voorhees shall be referred to hereafter as "Appellant," and the surviving daughters of the deceased
shall be referred to hereafter as "Respondents." References to the estate of Hillard L. Voorhees, deceased,
shall be referred to as "Estate", and the District Court of
Sanpete County shall be referred to hereafter as "Court."
References to the record of the Court below shall be as
follows: (R-1). References to the transcript of the proceedings of the Court below shall be as follows: (Tr-1).
STATE~IEXT

OF FACTS

Hillard L. Voorhees died intestate in Manti, Sanpete
County, State of Utah, on the 24th day of July, 1956,
leaving surviving him as his sole and only heirs at law
the Appellant and the Respondents.
On September 2-1, 1956, the Appellant filed Petition
for Letters of Administration of the Estate (R-1, 2). On
October 24, 1956, Letters of Administration were granted
to the Appellant by the Court (R-9) and on October 29,
1956, t Jw Court ordered the .Appellant appointed Adminil"t.ratrix of the Estate (R-8).
On Septen1ber ~5. 1957. the Respondents filed a
Petition for Revocation of Letters of .Administration previoul"ly granted to thP .Appellant, together with a Motion
for Order to Show Cause based upon said Petition (R-29,
34). The Petition for R.evocation of Letters of Adminis·
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tration basically alleged that the Appellant as Administratrix had neglected the affairs of the Estate in that
she had failed to account for property of the Estate
coming into the Appellant's possession, and, further,
said Petition requested that the Walker Bank & Trust
Company be appointed successor administrator of the
Estate. Hearing of said Petition for Revocation of
Letters of Administration and Order to Show Cause was
held before the Court on October 21, 1957.
At the commencement of the hearing on October 21,
1957, it was stipulated between counsel for Respondents
and counsel for Appellant that the Appellant would resign as Administratrix of the Estate and Walker Bank &
Trust Company be appointed successor administrator
(Tr-31, 32). The Court subsequently entered its oral
Order that the Letters of Administration previously
granted to the Appellant be revoked on stipulation of
counsel, and appointed the Walker Bank & Trust Company as successor administrator (Tr-109). Evidence was
then received by the Court at the October 21, 1957, hearing concerning the property of the Estate and its location for the purpose of future actions ( Tr-4, ()). Pursuant
to the Stipulation of counsel the Court on October 28,
1957, entered its Order Revoking the Letters of Administration and appointing Walker Bank & r:rrust Company
successor administrator of the Estate (R-86), and it
was further Ordered hy the Court that the Appellant
make an accounting of the property of the Estate on
or before 20 days from October 28, 19tr7. Two extensions
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of time were granted to the Appellant for filing a final
report and accounting as Ad1ninistratrix of the Estate

(R-87, 98).
At the request of Respondents on December 6, 1957,
the Walker Bank & Trust Company filed its rejection of
appointment as successor administrator of the Estate
(Tr-117, R-99), and on the same date the Respondents
petitioned for the appointment of Tracy-Collins Trust
Company as successor administrator (R-100, 102). Based
upon the Respondents' Petition for Appointment of
Successor Administrator dated Deceinber 6, 1957, the
Court issued an Order to Show 8ause why Appellant
should not be held in contempt for failing to file her
accounting of the Estate and why Appellant had not forfeited her right to serve as Administratrix or to designate or appoint a successor administrator. Hearing on
the Petition for Appointment of Successor Administrator of Respondents was set for Dece1nber 16, 1957. An
Answer to Respondents' Petition for ~-\.ppointment of
Successor Administrator was filed by ~-\. ppellant alleging
that the Appellant had not filed her accounting as A.dministratrix in view of the Order of the Court dated
December 2, 1957, extending the tiine of said filing for 20
days, and that in no 1nanner had the Appellant waived
her preferential right to n01nina te a successor administrator of the Estate. The Appellant's Answer further
nominated Walker Bank & Trust COinpan~- as successor
admini,stra tor of the Est at~ ( R-1 08-11 :2). On D~cember
16, 1957, the Walker Bank &. 'rrust C01upany tendered
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to the Court itH Notice of Revocation of it:; previou::; rejection as administrator (R-114) and also qualified by
tendering to the Court executed Letters of Administration for administration of the Estate (R-113). A
hearing was held before the Court on December 16, 1957,
at which time the Trust Officer of Walker Bank & Trust
Company, Mr. Claire Mortenson, testified as to the reasons for the revocation of its previous rejection of
Letters of Administration (Tr-129). The Court at the
close of this hearing entered its oral Order appointing
Tracy-Collins Trust Company successor administrator
(Tr. 160).
The Order appointing successor administrator (R121, 122) from which this interlocutory appeal was granted was entered by the Court on December 21, 1957, as
modified by the letter of the Judge of the Court below
dated December 24, 1957 (R-165, 166). The Order of the
Court appointed Tracy-Collins Trust Company as successor Administrator of the Estate, restated in part the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which were
filed on the same date (R-115, 118). In substance these
Findings restated in the Order were that Tracy-Collins
Trust Company was legally competent to serve as successor administrator of the Estate, and that Walker Bank
& Trust Company heretofore had filed its Notice of Rejection of Letters of Administration because of its policy
not to become involved in litigation against a surviving
widow who rnakes an adverse claim and owns propert~'
as against the claim of the J1Jstate, and that 1,racy-Collins
Trust Company would act fairly and impartially in
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administering the affairs of the Estate. The offer of
Walker Bank & Trust Company to withdraw its rejection of appointment as successor administrator of the
Estate was refused by the Court unless Tracy-Collins
Trust Company should fail or refuse to execute its oath
of office within five days from the date of the Order,
in that event the Court would consider an informal Motion on five days notice for the reinstatement of Walker
Bank & Trust Company.
STATEMENT OF POIKTS
POINT I.
THE COURT BELOW IN APPOINTING TRACY-COLLINS
TRUST COMPANY SUCCESSOR ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ESTATE OF HILLARD L. VOORHEES, DENIED THE APPELLANT'S PREFERENTIAL STATUTORY RIGHT FOR
THE APPOINTMENT OF A SUCCESSOR AD::\IINISTRATOR
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 75-4-1 and 75-6-3,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
POINT II.
EVEN IF THE APPELLANT IN SO::\IE MANNER HAD
EITHER WAIVED OR CONDUCTED HERSELF AS ADMINISTRATRIX SO AS TO LOSE HER PREFERENTIAL RIGHT
TO NOMINATE A SUCCESSOR ADMINISTRATOR TO THE
ESTATE, THE WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, BY
FILING A REVOCATION OF ITS PRIOR REJECTION OF
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION BEFORE THE APPOINTMENT OF TRA·CY-COLLINS TRUST COMPANY AS SUCCESSOR ADMINISTRATOR, HAD A PRIOR RIGHT TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE, AND THE COURT
ERRED IN ITS ORDER OF DECEMBER 21, 1957, IN NOT
APPOINTING WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY SUCCESSOR ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE.
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ARGUl\tlEN'r
POINT I.
THE COURT BELOW IN APPOINTING TRACY-COLLINS
TRUST COMPANY SUCCESSOR ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ESTATE OF HILLARD L. VOORHEES, DENIED THE APPELLANT'S PREFERENTIAL STATUTORY RIGHT FOR
THE APPOINTMENT OF A SUCCESSOR ADMINISTRATOR
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 75-4-1 and 75-6-3,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.

By the Court's Order of Dece1nber 21, 1957 (R-119),
Tracy-Collins Trust Company was appointed successor
administrator of the Estate and Letters of Administration were to be issued to the Tracy-Collins Trust Company upon their taking and subscribing the oath as required by law on or before December 21, 1957, this appointment being pursuant to the Petition of Respondents
(R-101). The Appellant in Answer to the Petition for
successor administrator filed by the Respondents nominated Walker Bank & Trust Company to be successor administrator to herself (R-111).
Section 75-4-1, U.C.A., 1953, im;ofar as applicable,
provides as follows:
"To whom granted Ad1ninistration of the estate of a person dying intestate must be granted
to some one or Inore of the person:::; hereinafter
1nentioned, the relatives of the deceased being entitled to administer only when they are entitled
to succeed to his personal estate or some portion
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thereof; and they are respectively, entitled thereto in the following order:
(1)

The surviving husband or "Wife;

( 2)

The children ...

Administration may be granted to one or more
competent persons although not otherwise entitled to the same at the written request of the
person entitled filed in the Court."
The Appellant exercised her preferential right for
appointment as Administratrix of the Estate by filing
her petition for Letters of Administration on September
24, 1956, the date of the demise of the deceased being
July 24, 1956. This exercise of preferential right was
accomplished within the time limit of three months provided in 75-4-3, U.C.A., 1953.
The Appellant designated a successor administrator, the Walker Bank & Trust Company, as is provided
in Section 75-6-3 U.C.A., 1953, which provides:
"Appointment of a successor-In case of the
removal, resignation, or death of one of several
Executors or Ad1ninistrators. the Court, if it
deems it necessary. Inay appoint a successor or
may permit the ren1aining executor or executors,
administrator or adn1inistrators. to cmnplete the
exe~ution of the trust. In case of the death, resignat~on ~r removal of all, the Court shall, upon
no!1ce, .~ssue Letters to the person ha ring the
pnor nght thereto, or to any competent person
named by the person having such prior riqht . .. "
(Emphasis ours.)
"
·
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The language of 75-6-3, U.C.A., 1953, manifests a
clear legislative intent to continue the preferential right
of 75-4-1 U.C.A., 1953, to apply to the appointment of
successor administrators in the event of resignation
or removal of an administrator. It will be noted that the
preferential right of nominating a successor adminisb·ator under 75-6-3 U.C.A., 1953, is granted even in the
event of "removal" of the administrator. The only qualification placed upon the exercise of this preferential right
of nomination of successor administrator in 75-6-3 U.C.A.,
1953, is that the nominee be "competent." The Appellant
after termination of her period as Administratrix of the
Estate nominated the Walker Bank & Trust Company to
act as successor administrator of the Estate. Although
Respondents may argue that the Court found Walker
Bank & Trust Company "incompetent" in the Findings
of Fact made by the Court (R-115-118), it is paradoxical
that the Court previously considered Walker Bank &
Trust Company "cmnpetent" to act as successor administrator of the Estate (Tr-32), and in the Order from
which this appeal is taken the Court further states it
will consider the appointment of Walker Bank & Trust
Company as successor administrator of the Estate (R121). The Court's own actions negate any inference of a
lack of competency on the part of Walker Bank & Trust
Company to serve as successor administrator of the
Estate.
The revocation of Letters of Administration of the
Appellant (R-86) could not constitute a waiver or a legal
deprivation of the preferential right of the Appellant to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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nominate the successor administrator of the Estate.
Before proceeding further, let us examine the circumstances surrounding the Court's Order revoking the
Letters of Administration of the Appellant and appointing Walker Bank & Trust Company successor administrator of the Estate. This Order resulted from a hearing
before the Court on October 21, 1957. The purpose of the
hearing was to determine the merits of the Petition for
Revocation of Letters of Administration filed by the
Respondents. As was cogently stated by counsel for the
Respondents at the commencement of this hearing, its
purpose was :
"Mr. Nielsen: And this proceeding is for the
purpose of examining her concerning where that
property may be and whether she claims an adverse interest, and to ask that an independent and
impartial person be appointed administrator so
as to take such action as 1nay be necessary to
bring that property in to the estate.
We are not asking the Court to pass upon,
at this time, the ownership of the property. If she
could clann adversely, I don't know whether she
will claim it adversely or not. but if she does,
under the Section under which we brought it the
Court is not required, need not pass upon the
ownership of it.
But we think an adn1inistrator which is impartial and free fron1 prejudice and has no conflicting int.en·~t in the estate should be appointed to look Into the 111atter and to take such action
as Inay be necessary." c~rr-4).
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In response to the opening statement by counsel for
the Respondents, counsel for the Appellant stated:
"Mr. Worsley: Your Honor, it would appear
to us that the essential purpose of the hearing
this morning deals with the question as to whether
or not Mrs. Voorhees should continue as administratrix. We have given the 1natter some thought,
Your Honor, and believe that under the circumstances here, since apparently there are adverse
claims existent, that it would be best if the court
did permit her to resign and to substitute another
administrator until this matter is resolved.
I would like to nmke very clear to the court
and to counsel for petitioners, as well as the petitioners themselves, that we do not in any sense
concede that their claims have any foundation.
Quite contrary. But there would appear to be a
conflict of interest and under those circumstances
we feel that she would, should be, would be willing
to step aside for the time being. I make it clear,
however, also to the court that in all probability
when such conflict has been resolved we may again
petition to have her re-appointed." (Tr-5).
The counsel for the respective partie:::; indicated to
the Court their assent to the appointment of Walker
Bank & Trust Company as successor administrator (Tr5, 6). The nature of the stipulation for resignation of
the Appellant is clearly set out by counsel for the respective parties and the Court :
".Mr. Niel:::;en: ln view of the stipulation hetween the partie:::; will Your Honor indieate to
counsel at this time that the, he will accept the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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resignation of Mrs. Voorhees and appoint the
Walker Bank so that we may proceed on that
basis and have them qualify~

* * *
The Court: If she is going to stipulate to her
attorneys she will resign, that is one thing.
Whether the court will force her to is another
thing.
Mr. Worsley: She has stated to the court,
and so states through us, that she is willing to
resign, Your Honor, and consents that Walker
Bank and Trust Company be appointed in her
stead, administrator DBN.
Mr. Nielsen:
that you would be
make a direction
proceed. That is
court to do.

Would Your Honor indicate
willing to have that done, or to
in the record so that we can
the thing that I wanted the

The Court: "\Yell, on stipulation of counsel
I wouldn't have any objection to it.'' (Tr-31, 32).
From the colloquy between the Court and counsel
on October 21, 1957, it is quite apparent that the Court
revoked the Letters of Administration solely upon the
grounds of the stipulation between Counsel, and the same
is reflected in the Order Revoking the Letters of Administration and appointing a successor adn1inistrator (R-86,
Tr-31, 32). As stated by counsel for Respondents, Mr.
Nielsen, (Tr-107):
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Ye:::;, pur:::;uant to a request for resignation.
We have both :::;tipulated that :::;he may resign.
I haven't pressed the point of whether she should
be compelled to. She has asked the Court to let
her and I am willing to let her resign." (Tr-107).
The evidence adduced at the hearing of October :n,
1957, was, according to counsel for Respondents, for the
purpose of determining the property included within the
Estate and its location (Tr-4, 6). From the evidence presented the Court made no finding of mismanagement,
waste or failure to cornply with the Order:::; of the Court
by the Appellant as Administratrix of the Estate in revoking the letters of Administration of the Appellant.
The Letters of Administration were not revoked for
cause, but rather by stipulation of the parties. It is
respectfully submitted, therefore, that the appellant has
in no fashion waived her preferential right to nominate
a successor administrator even though she disqualified
herself to act by resigning as Administratrix.
The preferential right for appointment of administrators and their successors as outlined in Sections 75-4-1
and 75-6-3, U.C.A., 1953, has been upheld by our Court
when the person with the preferential right has exercised
it in accordance with the Statutes of this State as was
done by the Appellant in the instant case. Three Utah
cases aptly demonstrate the Court's attitude toward
this preferential right:
The first is In Re Pingree's Estate, (1929), 74 lltah
38-!, 279 P. 901. In this case the widow of the dPeea~P(l
petitioned for Letters of Administration. A number of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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her children objected to her appointrnent as administratrix and filed a cross-petition for the appointment of one
of the sons of the deceased as administrator. The lower
Court denied the widow her preferential right on the
grounds that there was some hostility between the widow
and the other heirs, and likely to be quarrels and friction
between herself and the other heirs, and that because
of this conflict her administration would not be impartial.
It also found that she had not filed her petition for appointment as administratrix within the requisite three
months statutory period. The Supreme Court of the
State of Utah, in reversing the lower Court and granting
to the widow her preferential right to be administratrix, stated at page 903:
"The Trial Court having found that Appellant is a competent person to be charged with the
administration of the affairs of the estate and inasmuch as her application was made within the
prescribed time fixed by Compiled Laws of rtah,
1917, Section 7598, she was entitled to Letters of
Administration of the Estate of the deceased as
a matter of right, in the absence of showing some
good and sufficient reason to the contrary. In Re
Owen's Estate, 30 Utah 351.85 Pac. 2Ti: In Re Slater's Estate, 55 Utah :25:2, 18-± Pac. 1017, it is conceded by respondents that the right to administer
the estate is a valuable right. Appellant, more
than any other single individual, is interested in
the economical and expeditious administration
of its affairs."
The second ease is lu Re Johnson's Estate, (1934),
84 Utah 186, 35 P. 2d 305. In the Johnson case, the widow
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the deceased had filed an action for divorce and the
interlocutory decree was granted about one month before
his death. The brother of the deceased petitioned for
Letters of Administration and was appointed Administrator. The widow then dismissed the divorce action and
petitioned for removal of the brother as administrator,
and petitioned for her own nominee to become administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband. The lower
Court removed the brother as administrator and appointed the nominee of the widow as the administratrix. This
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah. The Supreme Court in commenting on
the then Section 102-4-1 Rev. Stat. of l't., 1933, (now
Section 75-4-1, U.C.A., 1953) stated:
". . . Under the provisions of the compiled
Laws of Utah 1917, Section 7596, now Section 1024-1, Supra, she was entitled to have Letters of Administration of the estate of the deceased issued to
her as a matter of right, in the absence of showing
of some good and sufficient reason to the contrary
. . . a person having a preferential right may
nominate another to assume the administration of
the estate. Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, Section
102-4-3. Obviously, where a person having a preferred right nominates a competent person, the
appointment of such nominee is mandatory."
The third case supporting the Appellant's contention that she has been denied her preferential right by the
Order of the Court below, is In Re Martin's Estate (1946),
109 Utah 131, 166 P. 2d 197. In the l\lartin case, the
surviving daughter filed a petition for appointment of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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herself as adminstratrix of both her parents' estates.
The children of her deceased sister filed a cross-petition
objecting to her appointment on the grounds that the
surviving daughter was a married woman. This objection
was well taken under the then operative Utah Statute,
and, therefore, the surviving daughter nominated one
Nelson to be administrator. The lower Court would not
appoint Nelson as administrator, and appointed another
who subsequently resigned. Then Nelson's nomination
was revived, and he was appointed administrator. Nelson
then refused to qualify, and after his failure to qualify,
the surviving daughter petitioned for one Christensen to
be appointed administrator of the estates of her deceased
parents. The lower Court appointed her nominee, and
an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the State
of Utah. The Supreme Court upheld the appointment
of the lower Court and found that even though the surviving daughter of the deceaseds was rendered incompetent, she was not deprived of her right to nominate an
administrator nor had she waived her right when she
nominated a person who refused to qualify and act. The
Court, through Justice Turner, at page 199 stated:
"Mrs. Reynolds became disqualified to serve
when objection was made as provided in the Stat·
ute but such disqualification did not render her
incompetent to n01ninate. This right w·as not exhausted when she n01ninated Nelson and he refused to qualify and act. It should be re1nembered
that Mrs. Reynolds filed her Petition for Letters
shortly after the death of her father and within
the three months period prescribed by the statute,
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and tlm~ pre~erved thi~ right. ~ee Section 102-1:-3, r tah Code Annotated, 1943. ln Re Johnson's
Estate, S-l- Utah 168, 35 P. :2d 305; ln Re Smith':.;
Estate, 85 Utah 606, -±0 P. 2d 180; In Re Owen's
Estate, 30 Utah 351, 85 Pac. :277. Even though
the Statute declares them to be incompetent to
administer an estate, infants and incompetents,
through guardian~ and non-resident heirs, may
exercise the right of nomination under the Statute.
Appellant~ do not ~eriously contend that there
merit to their argument that Mrs. Reynolds
•waived' her right to nominate. A right cannot
be waived by exercising it. Had she failed to
file a petition for Letters of Administration within the statutory period, ~he might have waived
her right to nominate."

i~

lt is re~pectfully ~ubmitted that the Appellant in
the instant case has in no manner waived her right to
nominate a successor administrator, as a matter of fact
she has reserved this right by, first, filing as Administratrix, and second, by nominating a successor administrator. It is ~ubmitted that no finding or proof
has been adduced in the record of the Court below to
substantiate any denial by the Court of her preferential
right to nominate a ~ucces~or administrator.

The Supreme Court of the ~tate of Utah in the analogous cases set forth above has jealously guarded the
preferential right of the person granted h~, Statute to
nominate an admini~trator or succes~or adminit-1trator.
The Order of the Court he low from whieh tit it-1 Appeal
was granted flaunt~ a clear line of case law and statuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
tory authority in failing to honor the preferential right
of the Appellant to appoint her nominee as successor
administrator of the Estate.
POINT II.
EVEN IF THE APPELLANT IN SOME MANNER HAD
EITHER WAIVED OR CONDUCTED HERSELF AS ADMINISTRATRIX SO AS TO LOSE HER PREFERENTIAL RIGHT
TO NOMINATE A SUCCESSOR ADMINISTRATOR TO THE
ESTATE, THE WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, BY
FILING A REVOCATION OF ITS PRIOR REJECTION OF
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION BEFORE THE APPOINTMENT OF TRA·CY-COLLINS TRUST COMPANY AS SUCCESSOR ADMINISTRATOR, HAD A PRIOR RIGHT TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE, AND THE COURT
ERRED IN ITS ORDER OF DECEMBER 21, 1957, IN NOT
APPOINTING WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY SUCCESSOR ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE.

The Walker Bank & Trust Company rejected its appointment as successor administrator of the Estate on
December 6, 1957 (R-99), pursuant to the request of
Respondents (Tr-118). On Dece1nber 16, 1957, \\:.,.alker
Bank & Trust Company filed with the Court its revocation of previous rejection of Letters of Aillninistration
and executed and tendered Letters of Aillninistration (R113, 114), and further stated its desire to qualify as successor administrator of the Estate. ~lt the hearing before
the Court on December 16, 1957. the Court considered
the problem of appointiuent of a successor aillninistrator
of the Estate, i.e. whether to appoint the nonunee of the
Appellant or the non1inee of the Respondents. The Court,
at the close of the hearing of Dece1nber 16, 1957, denied
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the application of Walker Bank & Trust Company to be
reinstated as successor administrator and appointed
Tracy-Collins Trust Cmnpany ''substitute ad1ninistrator''
(Tr-160).
The general rule in this situation is set forth in 33
C.J.S. 955, Executors and Administrators, Sec. 47 (d) :
"d.

Retraction of Renunciation

Broadly speaking a renunciation may be retracted before, but not after, appointment of another to the office of administrator, and in cases
of doubt the matter is addressed to the discretion
of the Court.
While retraction of a renunciation of the
right to administer a decedent's estate is not
favored, such retraction is ordinarily permissible
prior to the grant of administration to another,
and it has been held that the question of permitting a retraction is committed to the sound discretion of the court. Generally speaking, however,
retraction should not be permitted while proceedings for the appointment of another are pending
or after another person has been appointed to
the office, unless it appears to the satisfaction of
the court that the renunciation wai:J executed by
a mistake."

It is respectfully sub1nitted that Walker Bank &
Trust Company submitted its rejection of administration
under the mistaken belief that it had to fulfill certain
committmeniS to Respondents and thPir eounsel (Tr129). On reconsideration at the request of the Appellant
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the Walker Bank & Trust Company determined that
it could do a service to the Estate by qualifying as administrator. Mr. Clair J\1:ortensen, Trust Officer, Walker
Bank & Trust Company, testified as to the reasons for
his company's actions stating that it was the policy of
the Walker Bank & Trust Company to provide an impartial, unbiased administration and to avoid litigation
by the Estate unless it would be in the best interests of
the Estate (Tr-129, 130, 131, 135).
At the conclusion of the hearing of December 16,
1957, without any examination of the other successor administrator nominee, the Court appointed Tracy-Collins
Trust Company successor administrator. Under such
ill-advised circumstances the Court made its appointment
rejecting the appointment of "Talker Bank & Trust Company. Such action by the Court is not only contrary to
the law, but also an abuse of its discretionary power.
Here a previously acceptable administrator was rejected
by the Court even though it had offered to qualify as administrator before the Court had appointed another administrator. And the Court did not ever see fit to examine the qualifications of the appointed adlninistrator.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant by the Order of the Court from which
this appeal was granted has been deprived of her preferential right to nominate and have appointed the
Walker Bank & Trust C01npany successor ad1ninistrator
of the Estate of her deceased husband. The action of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
Court appointing rl,raey-Collint5 Trut5t Company sueeessor
administrator not only ignored the statutory right of
the Appellant, but also failed to consider and apply the
general rule that a renunciation of administration can be
retracted before the appointinent of a suecessor administrator, as was done h!· Walker Bank & Trust Cmnpany
in the instant case.
The Appellant submits that the Order of the Court
below appointing Tracy-Collins Trust Company successor administrator of the Estate should be reversed and
that the Walker Bank & Trust Cmnpany should be appointed succes~;or administrator of the 1£state.
Respectfully ::mbmitted,
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
and JAMES A. MURPHY
AttoTneys for- Appellant

701 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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